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WHITMAN AND THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
CONUNDRUM 
Lisa M. Fairfax* 
INTRODUCTION 
While the law on insider trading has been convoluted and, in Judge Jed S. 
Rakoff’s words, “topsy turvy,”1 the law on insider trading is supposedly clear 
on at least one point:  insider trading liability is premised upon a fiduciary 
relationship.  Thus, all three seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases articulating 
the necessary elements for demonstrating any form of insider trading liability 
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 made 
crystal clear that a fiduciary relationship represented the lynchpin for such 
liability.3 
Alas, insider trading law is not clear about the source from which the 
fiduciary relationship arises.4  Some insist that the source is federal law, 
while others insist that it is some aspect of state law.5  Twenty-five years ago, 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge emphasized the relative lack of attention 
focused on this source question, noting that such inattentiveness “robbed the 
federal insider trading prohibition of coherence and predictability.”6  
 
*  Alexander Hamilton Professor of Business Law, The George Washington University Law 
School.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Securities and Consumer 
Litigation—Pathways and Hurdles, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Institute for 
Law and Economic Policy on February 28, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.  
Special thanks to Judge Jed S. Rakoff for his searching inquiries into insider trading issues 
and passionate dedication to the law.  Thanks to Judge Gerard E. Lynch, John Coffee, Jill 
Fisch, Donald C. Langevoort, Robert Rothman, and Audra Soloway for their comments on 
earlier versions of this Article and to Nickolas Kinslow for invaluable research assistance.  I 
would also like to thank the Fordham Law Review editors for all their hard work on this piece.  
All errors, of course, are mine. 
 
 1. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014); Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 928, 931 (2014) (referencing insider trading law as a “theoretical mess,” “seriously 
flawed,” “ill-defined,” and “astonishingly dysfunctional”). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq. 
 3. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary 
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–36 (2009). 
 4. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 367. 
 5. See SEC v. Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d 569, 582 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (noting a federal circuit 
split on this issue). 
 6. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the 
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1995). 
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Nevertheless, this inattentiveness persists, causing debate about the source to 
periodically remerge. 
In United States v. Whitman,7 Judge Rakoff sought to settle this debate in 
favor of federal law.8  While the Second Circuit affirmed the holding,9 other 
federal and state courts contend that the source of the fiduciary relationship 
stems from state law.10 
This Article agrees with the result in Whitman but nevertheless argues that 
pinpointing appropriate rationales for the result is challenging primarily 
because the insider trading regime is riddled with mixed signals.  On the one 
hand, as Judge Rakoff notes, the notion that state law should define the 
fiduciary relationship is highly problematic not only because of the potential 
variance from state to state11 but also because of the considerable uncertainty 
regarding which state law controls the fiduciary relationship question.12 
On the other hand, pinpointing a convincing rationale for the primacy of 
federal law poses difficulties.  To be sure, Judge Rakoff advances rationales 
well-grounded in federal law and important and familiar policy goals, 
including the oft-cited goals of uniformity and promotion of disclosure in the 
federal securities law system.13  Nonetheless—and precisely because of the 
confounding state of insider trading laws—it is possible to take issue with 
these rationales.  First, these rationales sit uncomfortably with federal 
precedent clearly disfavoring federal common law as well as federal courts’ 
clear reliance on state law when developing insider trading laws.14  Second, 
these rationales center on policy goals associated with uniformity and 
disclosure that are also awash in mixed signals.15  Third, these rationales fail 
to appropriately account for the existing and preexisting role of state law in 
policing insider trading claims.16 
After highlighting the confounding nature of these rationales, this Article 
offers the principle of certainty as a possible rationale that more effectively 
justifies the federal preference while balancing the roles of state and federal 
law.  Importantly, this Article contends that the resolution of this source issue 
is critical because of the centrality of the fiduciary relationship to insider 
trading law.  Pinpointing appropriate rationales for this resolution is also 
critical.  In other contexts, Supreme Court cases have focused on problematic 
 
 7. 904 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 8. See id. at 374. 
 9. See Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 10. See, e.g., Mueller v. Thomas, 84 F. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Fortson 
v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992); Abell v. Potomac 
Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 
F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 11. See Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 370. 
 12. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing state law uncertainty). 
 13. See generally John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984). 
 14. See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 15. See infra Parts III.B, III.C. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
2020] THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP CONUNDRUM 411 
reasoning to discard court rulings, including rulings based on well-settled and 
long-held principles.17  These cases affirm this Article’s core assertion that 
the reasoning we use matters. 
Part I examines the primacy of fiduciary relationships to insider trading 
liability and highlights the divergent opinions related to the source of that 
relationship.  Part II reveals the mixed messages undergirding our insider 
trading laws to demonstrate why reliance on those laws poses challenges for 
a convincing response to the source question.  Part III evaluates policy goals 
animating the source debate and, after demonstrating some of the difficulties 
with those goals, focuses on the possibility of certainty as a guiding principle.  
Part IV concludes by offering the principle of certainty as a possible rationale 
that more effectively justifies the federal preference while balancing the roles 
of state and federal law. 
I.  FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE SOURCE SPLIT 
A.  Relationship Versus Duty 
The concepts of fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duty are often used 
interchangeably even though they focus on two distinct issues.  The fiduciary 
relationship relates to the characteristics of a relationship that qualifies as 
“fiduciary” in nature.18  The Supreme Court has referred to this relationship 
as one in which information is entrusted with an expectation that it be held 
in confidence, distinguishing the fiduciary relationship from one involving 
parties who are “complete stranger[s].”19  Fiduciary duty refers to the 
obligations that arise from the fiduciary relationship.20  For purposes of 
insider trading, people within a fiduciary relationship have a fiduciary duty 
to either disclose confidential information to those within their fiduciary 
relationship or abstain from trading on the information.21  In addition to this 
“disclose or abstain” duty,22 the Court has recognized a fiduciary duty to 
refrain from passing confidential information for a personal benefit.23 
Although distinct, these two concepts are inextricably linked.  This is 
because to violate the insider trading laws, a person must violate the fiduciary 
duty arising out of a fiduciary relationship.24  In Chiarella v. United States,25 
the Supreme Court concluded that the trader did not have the necessary 
 
 17. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019) (overturning 
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985), because of “exceptionally ill founded” reasoning); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. 
Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019) (overturning Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), based on the “quality 
of the decision’s reasoning”).  
 18. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228, 232–33 (1980). 
 19. Id. at 232–33. 
 20. See id. at 231–32; SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(en banc). 
 21. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32; Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. 
 22. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. 
 23. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
 24. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230; Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1199. 
 25. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
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fiduciary relationship to expose him to insider trading liability.26  In Dirks v. 
SEC,27 while a fiduciary relationship existed, the Court could not establish 
that anyone had breached a fiduciary duty arising from the relationship.28  
Thus, the issues of duty and relationship are distinct but related.  This Article 
focuses on the fiduciary relationship but recognizes that these concepts are 
interwoven and often discussed as if they are the same. 
B.  Centrality of the Fiduciary Relationship 
Whether someone trades or passes on confidential information, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that insider trading liability exists only if that 
someone breaches a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship.29  In 
Chiarella, the Court, led by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., took its first 
opportunity to address insider trading under Rule 10b-5 and link such 
liability to a fiduciary relationship.30  The Court announced that insider 
trading liability could only arise from an insider’s fiduciary relationship with 
the company in whose stock the insider trades, known as the “classical” or 
“traditional” theory of insider trading liability.31  In the Court’s view, 
fiduciary relationships under the classical theory included insiders, such as 
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders.32  Later courts, including the 
Supreme Court, extended the classical theory to all corporate employees, 
regardless of their positions,33 referring to such employees as “permanent 
insiders.”34  Fiduciary relationships under the classical theory also include 
“temporary” insiders such as attorneys, accountants, and consultants, 
entrusted with confidential corporate information.35  Because the trader in 
Chiarella was neither a permanent nor a temporary corporate insider, the 
Court held that he did not have the necessary fiduciary relationship for insider 
trading liability.36 
In United States v. O’Hagan,37 the Supreme Court extended insider trading 
liability beyond individuals in a relationship with the specific corporation 
that is the subject of the stock trades but nevertheless tethered the extension 
to fiduciary relationships.38  The “misappropriation theory” adopted in 
O’Hagan premises liability on a “fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of 
 
 26. Id. at 232–33. 
 27. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 28. Id. at 662. 
 29. See id. at 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32. 
 30. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. 
 31. See id. at 228; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997); Nagy, 
supra note 3, at 132. 
 32. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. 
 33. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; see also Mark J. Loewenstein & William K. S. Wang, 
The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 53–54 (2005). 
 34. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 35. Id. at 652; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983). 
 36. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231. 
 37. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 38. See Nagy, supra note 3, at 1339; see also Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of 
Congress:  Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 845, 864 (2013). 
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those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”39  While 
some of the Justices were willing to impose liability on misappropriators 
without a fiduciary relationship,40 the O’Hagan majority limited the theory 
to those within a fiduciary relationship or a similar relationship of “trust and 
confidence.”41 
In focusing on fiduciary relationships, the O’Hagan majority significantly 
raised the importance of that element in the insider trading inquiry.  It is 
notable that the relationship at the crux of O’Hagan was a prototypical 
fiduciary relationship.42  James O’Hagan was a partner in a law firm 
representing Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand Met”) in its potential tender 
offer for the Pillsbury Company (“Pillsbury”).43  O’Hagan purchased 
Pillsbury securities based on confidential information he learned through his 
firm, resulting in a $4.3 million profit once the tender offer was announced.44  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought suit against 
O’Hagan under Rule 10b-5.45  No one disputed that O’Hagan was clearly in 
a fiduciary relationship with his law firm and Grand Met; the relationship 
among a lawyer, the law firm, and the client is the kind of typical fiduciary 
relationship in which confidential information is entrusted.46  However, that 
fiduciary relationship was not with the company in whose stock O’Hagan 
had traded (i.e., Pillsbury), as required by the classical theory of insider 
trading.47  Thus, for the SEC to impose liability on O’Hagan, it would have 
to advance a new theory.  Expanding insider trading liability to include the 
misappropriation theory allowed the Court to capture people like O’Hagan 
who were in fiduciary relationships unconnected to the corporation in whose 
stock they traded.48  More importantly, by shifting focus away from the 
corporation that is the subject of the trade, the misappropriation theory 
further elevated the importance of the fiduciary relationship.49 
In Dirks, the Court again extended insider trading liability but to situations 
in which confidential information is passed by someone, i.e., the “tipper,” 
and then ultimately traded upon by someone else, the “tippee.”50  Although 
the SEC and the other Justices urged the Court to find liability in the absence 
of a fiduciary relationship, the majority—led by Justice Powell—refused.51  
The Court proclaimed, “[w]e were explicit in Chiarella” that no insider 
 
 39. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 40. See id. at 680–701 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Nagy, supra note 3, at 1330. 
 41. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228). 
 42. Id. at 647. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 648. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 650–53 (adopting the misappropriation theory). 
 49. See id. at 652–53. 
 50. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 51. See id. at 655–59 (rejecting the SEC’s position); see also Kim, supra note 38, at 863; 
Nagy, supra note 3, at 1327 (noting the Dirks majority used the word “fiduciary” thirty-three 
times). 
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trading liability could arise without a fiduciary relationship.52  Thus, even 
though tippers merely pass information without trading, tippers must 
nonetheless breach a fiduciary relationship in order to be held liable for 
insider trading.53  Tying the tippee’s liability to a fiduciary relationship was 
not as straightforward because, as the mere recipient of information, the 
tippee is not a party to a fiduciary relationship.54  The Court resolved this 
quandary by theorizing that the tippee assumes a fiduciary duty when the 
tipper breaches her fiduciary relationship and the tippee knows or should 
know about the breach.55  In the Court’s view, this made the tippee a 
participant after the fact in the tipper’s breach of her fiduciary relationship.56  
In this way, the Court managed to ‘“fiduciarize’ the tippee”57 and tether 
tippee liability to a fiduciary relationship, albeit indirectly.  The Court also 
made clear that a fiduciary relationship is the lynchpin for establishing any 
form of insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5.58 
Some may dismiss the continued importance of the fiduciary relationship.  
There is considerable evidence revealing that many courts have been willing 
to ignore or loosen the fiduciary construct when deciding insider trading 
cases.59  As Professor John Coffee suggests, this willingness is highlighted 
by recent Second Circuit cases that appear to have not only relaxed the 
importance of fiduciary duty in tipping cases60 but also eliminated the 
necessity of proving fiduciary duty altogether.61  Given the high volume of 
insider trading cases in the Second Circuit, its pronouncements on this 
issue—and seeming movement away from fiduciary concepts—are 
significant. 
However, these movements in the Second Circuit do not signal a complete 
abandonment of the fiduciary relationship construct.  First, these cases focus 
on tipping and thus may only be applicable to a subset of insider trading 
cases.62  Second, these cases focus on fiduciary duty and thus do not directly 
 
 52. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
 53. See id. at 654–55. 
 54. See id. at 655; Nagy, supra note 3, at 1328. 
 55. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659. 
 56. See id. at 658. 
 57. Nagy, supra note 3, at 1328. 
 58. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
 59. See Nagy, supra note 3, at 1336–52. 
 60. See generally United States v. Martoma (Martoma II), 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(relaxing the personal benefit rule); United States v. Martoma (Martoma I), 869 F.3d 58 (2d 
Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).  
 61. See United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding liability for 
passing confidential information under Title 18 that does not have a fiduciary duty element). 
 62. The Second Circuit cases, Martoma I and Martoma II, both involved allegations 
related to tipping and held that, to be convicted of insider trading, the tipper did not need to 
have a “meaningfully close relationship” with the tippee. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73; 
Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 69–70.  Instead, the tipper could be held liable if the tipper had a 
fiduciary relationship and breached her duty by passing information for a personal benefit, 
which could include an intention to benefit the tippee—irrespective of the relationship 
between the tipper and the tippee. See Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 75; Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 
69–70.  United States v. Blaszczak also involved tipping liability.  In that case, the Second 
Circuit held that the Dirks personal benefit test used for finding liability in the tipping context 
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speak to the significance of the relationship inquiry.63  Third, and most 
importantly, even as courts (including the Second Circuit) appear willing to 
weaken the fiduciary duty constraint, courts have been very clear, in both 
tipping and trading cases, that a fiduciary relationship remains an essential 
element.64  Such cases therefore reveal that a fiduciary relationship continues 
to play a pivotal role in the insider trading ecosystem. 
C.  The Federal Circuit Split 
1.  Understanding the Source Question 
The source question refers to which law governs the issue of whether a 
fiduciary relationship exists.  In other words, should courts look to state law 
or federal law when seeking to ascertain if a fiduciary relationship exists?  
Given the necessity of a fiduciary relationship, if a court determines that no 
such relationship exists, then no liability exists.  Hence, which forum governs 
the question can be outcome determinative and thus has significant 
ramifications for assessing who is exposed to insider trading liability. 
2.  Whitman and Federal Common Law 
In Whitman, Judge Rakoff held that federal common law governed the 
source question.65  In that case, the defendant, a lower-level employee, 
argued that state law determined the question of fiduciary relationship.66  The 
defendant then argued that he was not in a fiduciary relationship for insider 
trading purposes because the law of the relevant state, California, did not 
consider low-level employees to be in a fiduciary relationship with their 
corporations.67  Judge Rakoff concluded federal common law controlled the 
question of what constituted a fiduciary relationship.68  Based on that 
conclusion, Judge Rakoff easily found that the defendant could be subject to 
insider trading liability because federal law not only characterizes all insiders 
as participants in a fiduciary relationship but also imposes upon such 
 
does not apply to the federal wire fraud and securities fraud statutes under Title 18. Blaszczak, 
947 F.3d at 37. 
 63. See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 37 (focusing on the need to establish a personal benefit 
test, which is linked to the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty); Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64, 67–
68, 72–73 (focusing on the tipper’s breach of her fiduciary duty and finding that the necessary 
breach centered on the purpose of the tip and that so long as the tipper’s purpose was to benefit 
the tippee, a breach could be established); Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 63–64, 69–70 (focusing on 
elements needed to demonstrate that a tipper had breached her duty and finding that a breach 
did not require the existence of a meaningfully close relationship). 
 64. See Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 58–61, 63–64, 69–70 (noting that the tipper—Gilman—
had a relationship where he was entrusted with confidential information and expected to 
refrain from disclosing such information); see also Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64, 67–69, 72–73 
(noting the same). 
 65. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 
F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 66. See id. at 368. 
 67. See id. at 369. 
 68. See id. at 374. 
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participants a duty to “disclose or abstain” that the defendant clearly 
violated.69 
In Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc.,70 the Second Circuit agreed with the Whitman 
holding.71  Steginsky involved corporate insiders who had traded in shares of 
their corporation’s stock.72  The defendants argued that the law of the state 
in which the corporation was formed, the Cayman Islands, governed the 
question of whether they owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation.73  The law 
of the Cayman Islands apparently did not recognize a fiduciary relationship 
or otherwise impose a fiduciary duty on corporate insiders in this context.74  
The defendants sought to rely on state law to refute the finding of a fiduciary 
relationship, thereby avoiding insider trading liability.75  Citing Whitman, the 
Second Circuit held that federal common law controlled the issue.76  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that it had not previously 
made the source of the fiduciary principle explicit and hence was correcting 
that oversight.77 
At least two district courts in the Fifth Circuit have found that federal law 
governs the resolution of issues under the federal securities laws.78  In 2017, 
a judge in the Eastern District of Texas, citing both Whitman and Steginsky, 
concluded that federal law governed the question of the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship under the federal securities laws.79  This case involved 
securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5, arising out of allegations of 
misstatements and omissions by a promoter of a corporation’s stock, not 
insider trading.80  However, the court focused on the fiduciary relationship 
requirement under Rule 10b-5 and relied on Whitman when assessing the law 
governing that requirement.81  The SEC argued that state law controlled the 
question of whether the promoter owed a duty to purchasers of the stock.82  
Importantly, while federal law did not recognize a fiduciary relationship in 
this context, the SEC contended that state law did.83  The court noted that the 
Fifth Circuit had not yet determined whether state or federal law applied to 
determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship and that the federal circuits 
were split on the issue.84  After analyzing that split, the court announced its 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. 741 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 71. See id. at 371. 
 72. See id. at 367. 
 73. See id. at 371. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See generally SEC v. Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d 569 (E.D. Tex. 2017); SEC v. Cuban, 
634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated by 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 79. See Mapp, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 583. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 582–83. 
 82. See id. at 582. 
 83. See id. at 582–83. 
 84. See id. at 582. 
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agreement with Whitman and the Second Circuit.85  The court then concluded 
that, because federal law did not recognize a fiduciary relationship, no insider 
trading liability could attach to the promoter’s activities.86 
Along these same lines, in SEC v. Cuban,87 a judge in the Northern District 
of Texas held that federal law controlled the issue of fiduciary relationships 
under Rule 10b-5.88  In that case, the SEC brought an insider trading action 
against Mark Cuban based on the misappropriation theory.89  Cuban argued 
that state law governed the question of whether he had a fiduciary 
relationship for purposes of insider trading laws.90  While not discounting 
state law, the court concluded that federal law was relevant to the issue 
concerning the source of the fiduciary relationship on which insider trading 
violations were predicated.91  The decision was vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, so the Fifth Circuit never addressed the issue involving the 
appropriate source of the fiduciary relationship underlying the insider trading 
violation.92  However, it is noteworthy that on remand, the district court 
addressed the issue of source solely with reference to federal law.93 
3.  Federal Court Reliance on State Law 
Other federal courts interpreting § 10 and Rule 10b-5 have held that state 
law governs the source issue.94  These cases do not involve insider trading 
violations.95  Professors Donald C. Langevoort and Mitu Gulati have 
cautioned against importing the dicta and holdings of insider trading cases 
into noninsider cases, despite the fact that they rest on the same statute.96  
Mindful of that caution, this Article nonetheless contends that these cases 
have relevance to the fiduciary relationship inquiry.  Indeed, their caution 
focuses on courts’ attempts to apply the disclosure concepts embedded in 
insider trading cases to other securities law contexts.97  The cases this section 
highlights directly involve interpretation of fiduciary relationships in the 
context of securities fraud claims under § 10 and Rule 10b-5.98  Importantly, 
the cases often rely on insider trading cases such as Chiarella and Dirks for 
 
 85. See id. at 583. 
 86. See id. 
 87. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated by 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 88. See id. at 721–22. 
 89. See id. at 717. 
 90. See id. at 721. 
 91. See id. at 721–22. 
 92. See generally Cuban, 620 F.3d 551. 
 93. See SEC v. Cuban, No. 08-cv-2050-D, 2013 WL 791405, at *8–10 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 
5, 2013). 
 94. See generally Mueller v. Thomas, 84 F. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); 
Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1992); Abell v. 
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & 
Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under 
Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1675 (2004). 
 97. See id. at 1646–73. 
 98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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the proposition that liability for securities fraud must be premised on a 
fiduciary relationship.99  Thus, these cases implicitly embrace the contention 
that the principles related to the appropriate interpretation of a fiduciary 
relationship under insider trading rules are the same as those related to 
securities fraud claims more generally.100  As such, these cases serve as a 
useful guide for understanding the nature of the disagreement concerning the 
source of fiduciary relationships under Rule 10b-5. 
The Fourth Circuit has been cited by litigants and other courts addressing 
the source issue under insider trading laws for the proposition that state law 
controls the source question.  In Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & 
Minick,101 investors who purchased stock in a real estate venture brought a 
securities fraud action under § 10(b) against a law firm representing the 
venture, alleging that the law firm had breached its duty to disclose material 
information related to their investment.102  Citing Chiarella, the Fourth 
Circuit noted that liability related to an omission could only be established 
based on a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship.103  The Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “the federal securities laws are not the source” of the fiduciary 
relationship.104  Instead, the Fourth Circuit insisted that the fiduciary 
relationship “arises only where there is some basis outside [of] the securities 
laws, such as state law, for finding a fiduciary or other confidential 
relationship.”105  Because state law did not impose such a relationship in this 
context, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the necessary fiduciary 
relationship did not exist and hence the securities law claim could not be 
maintained.106 
In Mueller v. Thomas,107 the Fourth Circuit grappled with a claim 
involving allegations of securities fraud based on material misstatements and 
omissions within a stock purchase agreement.108  Citing Fortson, the Fourth 
Circuit reasoned that any duty to disclose had to arise from a fiduciary 
relationship under state law.109  Because Virginia state law did not recognize 
a fiduciary relationship between sophisticated commercial parties transacting 
at arm’s length, no duty existed upon which a securities fraud action could 
be premised.110  These and other Fourth Circuit precedents have been cited 
by litigants and other courts when analyzing insider trading claims.111 
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The Seventh Circuit also has held that state law controls the source issue 
for purposes of federal securities laws.112  In Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, 
Starnes & Holt,113 purchasers of bonds and notes brought suit against a law 
firm under Rule 10b-5, seeking to hold the law firm liable for misstatements 
and omissions related to the purchase of those securities.114  The Seventh 
Circuit cited Dirks and Chiarella for the proposition that the relevant duty to 
disclose must be based on a fiduciary relationship.115  The court then 
emphasized that this duty does not come from the federal securities laws but 
“from a fiduciary relation[ship] outside securities law.”116  The court further 
noted that if the duty stemmed from federal law, “the inquiry would be 
circular.”117  While the case does not deal explicitly with insider trading, the 
references to Dirks and Chiarella indicate the court’s belief that the laws of 
insider trading parallel the laws of securities fraud, at least with respect to the 
question of a fiduciary relationship. 
The Fifth Circuit has similarly been cited for the proposition that state law 
governs this source issue.  In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,118 bond 
purchasers brought a § 10(b) action against the developers whose companies 
issued the bonds.119  In seeking to analyze whether the developers could be 
held liable, the inquiry focused on whether they had a duty arising out of a 
fiduciary relationship between the purchaser and the developers.120  The Fifth 
Circuit asserted that this analysis must focus on state law.121  The court 
proclaimed that for purposes of resolving the question of source, it “join[ed] 
the Seventh Circuit.”122  The court then cited Barker for the proposition that 
liability must stem from an existing duty, not one created by or arising out of 
the federal securities laws.123  Given its citation to Barker, the court 
apparently agreed with the reasoning that otherwise the inquiry would be 
circular. 
D.  The Debate State Side 
Some state court judges and litigants have connected the source debate at 
the federal level to the analysis of fiduciary relationships at the state level 
because there are some breach of fiduciary duty claims under state law based 
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on insider trading violations.124  Those claims not only concern analysis of 
fiduciary relationships but also essentially piggyback off of relationships and 
duties germane to Rule 10b-5.125  Thus, these state law claims implicate the 
same fiduciary relationship implicated by federal law.126 
In Delaware, the heart of this debate is the continued viability of claims 
arising from the 1949 case of Brophy v. Cities Service Co.127 (so-called 
Brophy claims).  A Brophy claim is an action for breach of fiduciary duty 
arising out of an insider trading violation.128  Brophy centered on Thomas 
Kennedy, an executive secretary to one of a company’s directors.129  
Kennedy was privy to confidential company information, including 
information about the company’s intention to purchase its own shares.130  
Based on that information, Kennedy purchased a large block of his 
company’s shares and then resold them at a profit once the company 
repurchased shares.131  A core issue in Brophy was whether a “mere 
employee” could be held liable for breach of a duty related to insider trading 
activities.132  The court held that Kennedy could be held liable so long as he 
occupied a position of trust and confidence analogous to a fiduciary.133  That 
is, so long as he breached a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship.134  
After concluding that Kennedy’s position was fiduciary in nature because he 
was entrusted with access to confidential information, the court found that 
Kennedy could be held liable for breaching his fiduciary duty based on his 
insider trading activities.135 
Thereafter, Brophy, later affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court,136 set 
the standard for fiduciary duty claims in Delaware arising out of insider 
trading violations.137  Since 1949, Delaware courts have repeatedly relied on 
Brophy to prosecute breach of fiduciary duty claims involving insider 
trading. 
In 2010, the source question collided with Brophy claims, triggering a 
debate about the continued validity of those claims.  Based on the contention 
that federal law controlled the source question, some Delaware judges and 
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litigants began to question whether Brophy claims should be considered good 
law.138  These judges and litigants suggested that the controlling nature of 
federal law “arguably preempted” state law claims in this area.139  These 
parties further contended that because federal law controlled the source 
question, federal law demanded uniformity that crowded out state law.140 
In Pfeiffer v. Toll,141 the Delaware Court of Chancery mounted a strenuous 
defense of Brophy claims rooted at least in part in the notion that state law 
controls the source debate.142  Responding to the contention that Brophy 
claims were outdated and no longer relevant, the court insisted that state law 
fiduciary duty claims were relevant because the federal insider trading 
regime depended on state law.143  “Federal law does not give rise to or 
establish the fiduciary duties of directors or officers.  Those matters are 
governed by state law.  Thus the federal insider trading regime as currently 
structured rests on a foundation of state law fiduciary duties.”144  The court 
further argued that state law served as the “cornerstone” of the federal insider 
trading regime.145  The court then cited numerous insider trading cases, 
including Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks, not only to illuminate the insider 
trading system’s “dependence on [] underlying fiduciary relationships”146 
but also to support the contention that the Supreme Court had endorsed the 
notion that state law was the source of those underlying fiduciary 
relationships.147  The Pfeiffer court concluded by arguing that the notion of 
federal law as the dictator of the source question would be inconsistent with 
how the law had developed and the vital role breach of fiduciary duty claims 
played in that development.148  Hence, the Pfeiffer court upheld the viability 
of Brophy claims by rejecting the notion that federal law controlled the 
source debate.149  However, mindful of uniformity concerns, the Pfeiffer 
court limited the potential damages associated with a Brophy claim to those 
not duplicative of federal law.150 
The Delaware Supreme Court did not reject the Pfeiffer court’s analysis 
regarding state law as the genesis of fiduciary relationships for purposes of 
federal insider trading laws.151  In Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co.,152 
the Delaware Supreme Court sought to put concerns about the viability of 
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Brophy to bed and upheld its broad application and holding.153  The court 
invalidated the portion of the Pfeiffer opinion that sought to narrow Brophy’s 
reach.154  In doing so, the court clearly rejected the notion that state law could 
not play a role in policing insider trading violations and defining the fiduciary 
parameters related to those duties.155  However, the court did not directly 
address the Pfeiffer court’s analysis of the source issue, thereby leaving open 
the issue of source and how it impacts the state fiduciary claim. 
II.  DEBATING THE DEBATE 
In concluding that federal law controls the source issue, Judge Rakoff 
relies heavily on the foundational federal cases.156  However, those who 
disagree rely on those same foundational cases.157  As this part highlights, 
this fact underscores the mixed signals that may be broadcast by relying on 
those cases. 
A.  The Reality and Fiction of Federal Common Law 
Both Judge Rakoff and the Second Circuit note that the Supreme Court’s 
insider trading cases have implicitly assumed the fiduciary relationship 
question to be a matter of federal common law.158  Importantly, after his 
comprehensive review of Justice Powell’s notes and the history of Chiarella, 
Professor A. C. Pritchard concluded that in formulating the fiduciary 
relationship under Chiarella, Justice Powell “creat[ed] a federal fiduciary 
principle” akin to federal common law.159  Justice Powell wrote the majority 
opinions in both Chiarella and Dirks and, according to Pritchard, had become 
the Court’s “securities law leader.”160  Pritchard’s conclusion therefore 
reflects compelling evidence that federal common law represents the source 
of the fiduciary relationship.161 
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However, numerous courts and commentators have noted that such a 
conclusion appears inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.162  Pritchard 
concedes this inconsistency, noting that Chiarella “sits in considerable 
tension” with the “rejection of a federal fiduciary standard in Santa Fe.”163  
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green164 arose out of a Second Circuit holding 
that a short-form merger that ran afoul of state corporate law also violated 
Rule 10b-5.165  The Second Circuit concluded that federal common law, 
rather than state law, governed the existence of a fiduciary breach triggering 
federal liability.166  Overruling the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court 
asserted that courts should be reluctant to “federalize” portions of state 
corporate law dealing with securities transactions.167  Commentators contend 
that the message from Santa Fe was that federal courts were not to create 
federal common law in the area involving state fiduciary duties.168  Thus, the 
creation of federal law in Chiarella seems contrary to Santa Fe. 
This contradiction is especially notable in light of Justice Powell’s 
sentiments regarding the Second Circuit’s holding in Santa Fe.  As Pritchard 
notes, Powell found the holding “startling enough” that he “dictated a nine-
page memorandum summarizing it” and referred to the opinion as “obviously 
wrong.”169  Indeed, Justice Powell expressed a belief that § 10(b) was not 
intended “to create a federal common law.”170  These sentiments reveal that 
Powell’s creation of a federal common law in Chiarella was in tension with 
Santa Fe and Powell’s own views regarding the impropriety of federal 
common law.  More importantly, they highlight the mixed messages, and 
thus the considerable tension, associated with using Chiarella as support for 
the propriety of federal common law as a guiding principle. 
Relying on Chiarella for the proposition that federal law controls is 
especially problematic when one considers the clear fact that Justice Powell 
essentially ignored at least two sources of federal law in order to reach the 
holding in Chiarella.  First, Chiarella ignored or sidestepped Santa Fe.  
Second, it ignored federal law embodied in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co.,171 when it rejected the Second Circuit’s equal access theory in favor of 
a fiduciary principle.172  The one and only time the Supreme Court cited 
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Texas Gulf Sulphur was to note that other courts had validated insider trading 
related to undisclosed information.173  This cursory reference, despite the fact 
that Texas Gulf Sulphur was viewed as the leading authority on insider 
trading law at the time,174 reveals that Chiarella essentially refused to even 
acknowledge the only existing federal law on this issue.  Using Chiarella as 
support for the primacy of federal law when the Court appeared to give short 
shrift to federal law seems problematic. 
This analysis begs an important question:  why did Justice Powell ignore 
his deep concern for state law and create federal common law?  Pritchard’s 
extensive research reveals that Justice Powell was simply determined to 
reject the equal access theory articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur.175  Powell’s 
determination was so significant that he was willing to sidestep the dictates 
of Santa Fe and his strong concerns about the importance of state law.176 
Justice Powell also ignored several state laws in his rush to focus on those 
aspects of state law rooted in fiduciary relationships,177 a point Justices Harry 
Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall make in their dissent to Chiarella.178  
Indeed, the admittedly state law principle Powell adopted was not even a 
majority principle.  At the time of the decision, most states did not recognize 
a duty that extended from directors and officers to shareholders, and even 
those jurisdictions that did recognize such a duty did not extend it to cover 
lower-level employees or temporary insiders in the manner that Chiarella 
announced.179  Chiarella’s cherry-picking of state laws can only be 
understood in the context of Powell’s strong desire to craft a principle that 
would overturn Texas Gulf Sulphur.180  It is important to remember that when 
the Justices sought to establish the contours of an insider trading violation, 
unless they looked to state law, they were essentially writing on a blank slate.  
This is because the bulk of insider trading prohibitions does not arise from 
any specific statute; it therefore has to be a creature of judge-made law.181 
What does this mean for purposes of this Article’s thesis?  It simply further 
illuminates the mixed messages that pervade insider trading laws.  First, it 
underscores the unsatisfactory nature of relying on federal common law 
when the creator of federal common law had his own concerns about its 
propriety.182  Second, it highlights the problematic nature of relying on 
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Chiarella as theoretical support for the propriety of federal common law 
when the theory was simply a means to an end, and Chiarella overlooked 
sources of federal law to get to that end.183  Third, it reveals that the Justices 
at the time (including the author of Chiarella) had significant concerns that 
a federal common law would undermine the need to protect the role of state 
law.184  Justice Powell was simply willing to subordinate those concerns to 
achieve a particular outcome.  Taken together, this analysis highlights the 
challenges posed by reliance on federal common law as advanced under 
Chiarella. 
B.  The Role and Relevance of State Common Law 
The conclusion that federal law should be given primacy in relation to the 
source question also sits uncomfortably with the Supreme Court’s clear 
reliance on state law. 
Chiarella clearly relied on state law.  Chiarella noted that the concept that 
fiduciary relationships give rise to insider trading violations was not a novel 
twist.185  What was the only case law that Chiarella cited for this concept?  
Brophy.186  In this regard, the Chiarella court borrowed from state law to 
create the very foundation of the fiduciary relationship principle that governs 
all insider trading cases.187  Confirming this borrowing, commentators have 
noted that Chiarella appears to be based on a concept akin to the state law 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.188 
Similarly, in Dirks, the Supreme Court both acknowledged and relied upon 
state law.  The Dirks court recognized that fiduciary relationships on which 
insider trading breaches were premised arose from state law, noting that 
insiders have independent fiduciary duties that form the basis of the fiduciary 
relationship required for insider trading purposes.189  The Dirks court clearly 
affirmed that one way to establish a fiduciary relationship was through the 
preexisting fiduciary one rooted in state law.190  Dirks also premised its 
analysis related to violations of fiduciary duty by the tippee on concepts of 
agency law rooted in state law.191  Indeed, both the concept that a tipper 
violation occurs as a result of improperly communicating a fiduciary’s 
information and the concept that a violation occurs when a tippee receives 
confidential information that the tippee knows arises from improper 
communication, stem from state law concepts of agency and unjust 
enrichment.192  Pritchard observes that Justice Powell used Dirks to ensure 
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that “the federal common law of insider trading was brought into line with 
the traditional distinction in state corporate law between breaches of care and 
loyalty.”193 
A similar pattern emerges with respect to O’Hagan.  O’Hagan referenced 
state law concepts of agency law when articulating its broadening of the 
fiduciary relationship to include relationships of trust and confidence.194  
Langevoort and Gulati contend that O’Hagan incorporated state law 
fiduciary concepts in such an extensive manner that it made those laws play 
a “front and center” role in the insider trading landscape.195 
It is undeniable that each of the three foundational insider trading cases 
heavily relies on state law.  This clear reliance on state law in the origins of 
the insider trading prohibition muddies the waters, making it difficult to rely 
on these cases to provide clarity on the source question.  Even Judge Rakoff 
notes that general state law principles are helpful guides for determining the 
parameters of the applicable federal common law.196  This heavy reliance 
undercuts the notion that federal courts do not and should not look to state 
law.  It also begs an important question:  if federal courts have historically 
looked to state law to understand the parameters of the fiduciary relationship, 
why can they no longer do so? 
C.  The Conundrum of State Fiduciary Law 
The embrace of federal law in this area also sits in tension with the fact 
that insider trading laws appear to condone, if not approve, state law claims 
that arise from insider trading violations like Brophy.  How do we align the 
conclusion that federal law controls with these state law claims? 
First, there are important policy reasons why state law should continue to 
engage fiduciary duty claims based on insider trading.  For example, 
Delaware courts have emphasized the state’s strong public policy interest in 
policing loyalty violations, including those related to protecting the 
corporation’s interest in its confidential information and preventing the 
misuse of that information.197  Justice Leo E. Strine Jr. insisted that utilizing 
state fiduciary law to tackle insider trading serves the critical state interest of 
policing violations of the duty of loyalty.198  Other Delaware opinions 
similarly pinpoint states’ interest in preventing insiders from exploiting 
material private information to make trading profits199 or otherwise abusing 
their positions of trust and confidence.200 
State law is also valuable because it allows for recoveries distinct from 
those associated with insider trading prohibitions.  This includes “costs and 
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expenses for regulatory proceedings and internal investigations, fees paid to 
counsel and other professionals, fines paid to regulators, and judgments in 
litigation.”201  This also includes any costs incurred by the corporation as a 
result of the loyalty breach, such as investigation and litigation expenses 
associated with defending against a stockholder suit.202 
Both federal courts and commentators have acknowledged the important 
role of state law, and federal courts have consistently recognized the validity 
of those state law claims.  In singling out Brophy, the Chiarella court can be 
viewed as approving the fiduciary duty claims at the heart of Brophy.203  
Other courts interpreting federal securities laws related to insider trading 
have noted and assumed the existence of state law claims for a breach of 
fiduciary duty.204  In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court made specific reference 
to the fact that the misappropriator may have a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
under state law.205  Moreover, even as the Second Circuit adopted Whitman, 
it recognized the potential breach of fiduciary duty claims under state law.206 
Acknowledging the importance of state law in this arena has implications 
for those seeking to settle the source debate in favor of federal law.  If, as the 
Pfeiffer court suggests, the viability of a Brophy claim is dependent on the 
recognition that state law governs the source question, how do we reconcile 
that suggestion with the conclusion that federal law controls?  Even if that 
suggestion is invalid, there remains the problem that the notion that federal 
law controls the fiduciary relationship question may be causing some courts 
to question the viability of these state claims or otherwise to curtail their 
efforts related to fiduciary duty breaches in the realm of insider trading.  Here 
again, we may be sending mixed signals if we are not clear about why federal 
law controls and how that control should be reconciled with state law in this 
area. 
III.  IN SEARCH OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
A.  Why It Matters 
This Article asserts that federal law should control the source question.  
This Article also asserts that rationales matter.  The clarity of our rationales 
impacts how other courts assess any conclusions we make, including their 
willingness to accept those conclusions.  Several Supreme Court cases have 
essentially ruled that if decisions are based on convoluted, problematic, or 
“ill founded” reasoning, then the Court need not uphold those decisions.207  
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Importantly, the Supreme Court has used this notion of problematic 
reasoning to ignore long-held and well-settled doctrines.208  Hence, the Court 
has made clear that the reasoning on which we base conclusions matters.  Part 
II revealed that rationales based on case law are murky; this next section 
sheds light on the murkiness of some of the policy rationales heretofore 
advanced. 
B.  The Illusiveness of Uniformity 
At first glance, uniformity seems like an alluring guiding principle.  As 
Judge Rakoff notes, the history of insider trading suggests that the 
requirements associated with those rules were not designed to vary from state 
to state.209  Thus, the “idiosyncratic differences between the laws of various 
states cannot be allowed to trump the federal interest in combating insider 
trading.”210  The Second Circuit agreed that focusing on state law would 
thwart the goal of promoting national uniformity in the securities market.211  
Similarly, the SEC contended that focusing on state specific standards would 
serve to “balkanize” the insider trading laws, leading to “divergent outcomes 
under the federal securities laws depending on the state of jurisdiction in a 
particular insider trading case.”212  Indeed, based on the cases cited in this 
Article, the fiduciary relationship question could turn on the laws of 
California, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, or the Cayman 
Islands.  Importantly, these laws are outcome determinative.  For example, 
in Whitman, the relevant California state law limited fiduciary relationships 
to upper-level employees, while New York extended the duty to all 
employees.213  Given that the existence of the fiduciary duty is necessary to 
establish insider trading liability, if state law determines the duty question, 
then that law is outcome determinative to the insider trading liability 
question.  Because those laws differ, those outcomes can be different.  
Pritchard notes that even Justice Byron White, who authored Santa Fe and 
“went out of his way” to defend state corporate law, insisted that state law 
would need to give way to “ensure uniformity within the federal system.”214  
Thus, the concept of uniformity seems to align nicely with the goals and 
history of the federal securities laws. 
However, the uniformity rationale seems to provide another set of mixed 
messages.  First, it is arguable that you can achieve uniformity by adopting a 
“uniform rule” that federal courts should look to state courts to determine the 
content of fiduciary relationships.  A uniform rule that allows reliance on 
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state law aligns with the goal of allowing state laws to define the parameters 
of their preexisting state law relationships while having “uniformity” in the 
system.  This means that uniformity may not require an embrace of federal 
law.  Second, if the uniformity rationale is intended to ensure uniform impact 
or results, the rationale is inconsistent with insider trading laws because the 
fiduciary relationship concept guarantees that those laws will not have 
uniform impacts.  Instead, only those with a fiduciary relationship will be 
liable for insider trading, even if people trade on the same confidential 
information.  How does that promote the goal of uniform impact or results?  
And if the fiduciary relationship principle sacrifices uniformity, then how can 
uniformity be an appropriate goal on which we rely to dictate federal law’s 
propriety?  Finally, the concern for uniformity creates tension for state law 
concerns.  Clearly the notion that we need a unified system was a primary 
motivator of the concerns around the legitimacy of state law fiduciary 
claims.215  The claim for uniformity has no good answer for why these two 
regimes can and must be able to operate together. 
C.  The Trouble with Disclosure 
At first glance it makes sense for disclosure to serve as a policy goal when 
resolving critical insider trading questions.  The Supreme Court has 
specifically acknowledged that the purpose of Rule 10b-5 was to implement 
the philosophy of full disclosure.216  The federal securities law purpose of 
providing a uniform system of disclosure would be undermined if state law, 
with its many different vagaries, controlled the source issue.217  As Judge 
Rakoff notes, where the issue is a duty to disclose, federal law must be 
paramount to ensure transparency in the markets.218 
Unmasked, however, disclosure becomes a very problematic guiding 
principle.  This is because the fiduciary relationship principle narrows rather 
than expands disclosure, creating challenges with reliance on disclosure to 
support that principle.  It is clear that the general federal securities regime 
focuses on disclosure.  It is less clear that the insider trading rules are firmly 
premised on disclosure, at least not disclosure for all market participants.  
Instead, the fiduciary relationship principle only evidences concern about 
disclosure as it relates to those within a fiduciary relationship.  Those outside 
of the fiduciary relationship have no disclosure obligation.  In the context of 
the misappropriation theory, concern for disclosure is actually further 
devalued because disclosure is not even required to be made to the general 
public but only to the source of confidential information.  This analysis 
demonstrates that insider trading rules in general, and the fiduciary 
relationship principle in particular, are not necessarily overly concerned 
about disclosure.  As Langevoort and Gulati note, disclosure may just be a 
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tool being used to facilitate policing self-dealing transactions.219  This 
undermines the promise of disclosure as a guiding principle. 
Further, disclosure does not capture all of the goals associated with insider 
trading.  Disclosure as a goal works best when viewed in the context of 
traders because they can only trade with full disclosure.  Indeed, the tipper 
does not have a duty to disclose information.220  Moreover, disclosure does 
not absolve the tipper of responsibility or liability.221  Instead, the only thing 
that absolves the tipper is either abstaining from passing information or 
passing it for an appropriate purpose.222  This analysis only buttresses the 
view that disclosure in the context of insider trading is just a tool used to 
ensure that a breach of duty does not arise.223  Disclosure thus appears to be 
riddled with as many inconsistencies as the other rationales considered in this 
Article. 
D.  Certainty 
In revisiting and further considering why Whitman resonated, two 
principles emerge.  First, perhaps it is too much to ask that some broad 
principle can be used to answer all of the problems that arise in the insider 
trading ecosystem.  Second, perhaps, at least in this context, the real concern 
is certainty. 
1.  The Viability of Certainty 
What does certainty have to offer?  At its core, certainty facilitates reliance, 
including reliance on judicial decisions.224  Certainty promotes confidence in 
outcomes and decisions, credibility, and predictability and it signals fairness, 
all of which encourage reliance on judicial decisions.225  In other words, 
certainty ensures that people are not made to feel like the ground is “shifting 
beneath their feet.”226  Empirical evidence reveals that when the level of 
certainty in a court opinion increases, lower courts are more likely to 
positively treat the decision.227  As a result, “certainty stands for something 
that can help tip the scales in a case.”228 
Certainty is closely linked to the principle of stare decisis.  Stare decisis 
has been defended on grounds of certainty, i.e., the importance of making 
sure that the law will not change erratically and thus that society can presume 
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that there are bedrock principles that will not be overturned lightly.229  Thus, 
stare decisis promotes the predictable and coherent development of legal 
standards.230  In other words, it promotes certainty. 
Even Bainbridge has acknowledged the importance of certainty in this 
area.  While he believes in the propriety of state law as the source of the 
fiduciary question, Bainbridge essentially concedes that certainty may 
require the acceptance of preferring federal law.231  As he noted, “we have 
gone too far down the federal path to turn back.”232  Bainbridge also indicated 
that certainty has created expectations and interests that essentially solidify 
the case for preserving the status quo.233 
2.  Certainty and Coverage 
Certainty supports the preference for federal law over state law.  Federal 
insider trading laws are certain with respect to who is covered by the fiduciary 
relationship.  It is true that the concept of the fiduciary relationship had its 
genesis in a hodgepodge of state law.  Nevertheless, federal law has evolved 
into a relatively certain state.  As a consequence, there is really no uncertainty 
with respect to who federal law covers in the traditional fiduciary 
relationship.  Importantly, unlike other areas of insider trading law where 
federal courts struggle for clarity, there is very little dispute about how 
federal courts define a fiduciary relationship for purposes of the classical 
theory.  In this regard, federal law on the coverage issue is relatively stable 
and certain. 
By very sharp contrast, state law would introduce a level of uncertainty 
that would be unacceptable in at least two respects.  First, which state governs 
this issue?  The possibilities are numerous.  One is the law of the state in 
which the trading activity occurred.  Of course, if trading activities occur in 
multiple states, then uncertainty would arise based on how best to choose 
among those states.  A second possibility is the law of the state where the 
corporation is doing business.  A third possibility is the law of the state where 
the employees or those engaging in the trading activity are located.  In 
Whitman, the defendant combined these second and third possibilities, urging 
the court to focus on the law of the state where the tippers and their employers 
were located.234  This may not be the same place.  What if the employees 
worked or were located in a state different from where the corporation was 
located? 
A fourth possibility is the law of the state of incorporation.  Several 
scholars have noted that the internal affairs doctrine dictates that any question 
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of fiduciary duty gets determined by the state of incorporation.235  Of course, 
even this could implicate multiple states.  In Whitman, the confidential 
information at issue stemmed from three different companies:236  two 
companies incorporated in Delaware and one company incorporated in 
Bermuda.237 
A second area of uncertainty is which state law governs this issue.  
Potential contenders range from state laws on agency to unjust enrichment.  
The government in Whitman focused on the state’s agency law.  Other courts 
focus on fiduciary duty law.238  Still others have focused on state property 
law.239  Some courts have focused on the state law related to fiduciary 
relationships more broadly.240  Some focus on the laws of unjust 
enrichment.241  In Whitman, Judge Rakoff noted the many potential state law 
avenues.242  One can imagine that the specter of uncertainty raised by these 
varying avenues played a role in how he resolved the issue. 
This analysis reveals that certainty provides a clear answer to the source 
question:  federal law. 
3.  Certainty and State Fiduciary Claims 
Certainty also may serve as a useful guide in navigating the issues 
surrounding the proper balance between state and federal law.  Both 
explicitly and implicitly, federal courts have always acknowledged the 
important role states play in policing problematic behaviors of fiduciaries 
based on insider trading activity.243  State claims predated the articulation of 
insider trading rules.244  They also were at the heart of the type of claims that 
the Supreme Court made efforts to protect when crafting its jurisprudence 
related to securities fraud actions.245  And they, of course, formed the basis 
of the fiduciary principles on which the insider trading laws rest.  Given their 
historical presence on the corporate and securities law landscape, it could 
produce significant levels of uncertainty to proclaim that state law does not 
have a continued role in policing these claims. 
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Relying on certainty also may provide greater comfort to state law 
advocates around the issue of preemption.  The goals of uniformity and 
mandated disclosure may be viewed as in tension with the state system, 
which explains why some in the state system suggest that those goals require 
a focus on federal law coupled with a rejection of state law.  However, dual 
systems do not raise certainty issues.  At the federal level, as a result of the 
certainty related to coverage, federal courts no longer depend upon state 
courts to resolve the issue of a fiduciary relationship.  This means that the 
two systems need not merge or otherwise intertwine around this issue.  
Moreover, because the rationale for the federal preference is not tied to some 
form of uniform result or disclosure regime, state regimes can police state 
law violations in other or different ways so long as it does not negate the 
needed certainty associated with ensuring that federal law determines the 
coverage question.  To be sure, at the state level, at least with respect to 
coverage, it appears that state law actually draws upon federal law for 
purposes of pinpointing coverage related to insider trading claims linked to 
state fiduciary duty breaches.  Indeed, it has not been the case that these state 
fiduciary claims emerge based on relationships outside the parameters 
established by federal law.  Instead, they merely draw on the fiduciary 
relationships already established under federal law.  This not only 
demonstrates that the two systems can coexist but also suggests that there 
could be considerable uncertainty if federal law does not take the lead in 
pinpointing coverage.  While this does not undermine the state’s ability to 
extend or limit coverage in the context of its own state law claims, it does 
suggest that it would produce more (rather than less) uncertainty if the federal 
regime’s coverage role were supplanted entirely by state law. 
D.  Is Policy Good Policy? 
At the 2020 Institute for Law and Economic Policy (ILEP) conference, 
Judge Gerard E. Lynch raised concerns about relying primarily, if not 
exclusively, on policy rationales to support court decisions.  Judge Lynch 
noted that such reliance increases the possibility that judges will make 
decisions based on their own personal preferences rather than ensuring that 
decisions are tethered to a specific legal standard.  Professor Jill Fisch noted 
that the underlying policy goals of the insider trading laws may be as 
convoluted as the case law itself.  This is because the Justices disagreed about 
the appropriate policy goals of insider trading.  Other commentators have 
similarly noted that there are multiple policy goals animating insider trading 
laws, and some of those policy goals are in conflict with one another.  Thus, 
relying on policy goals could be as problematic and confusing as relying on 
the insider trading doctrine itself. 
While these sentiments certainly have merit, focusing on policy, at least in 
this limited context, is valid for several reasons.  First, as a general matter, 
focusing on policy is even more critical when the law itself is ad hoc and 
messy.  Second, focusing on policy is valuable when that focus can provide 
greater clarity.  While other policy goals may prove more vexing, the policy 
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goal associated with certainty provides clarity.  Indeed, this policy goal is 
one that is straightforward and avoids some of the boggy ground that is 
associated not only with other policy rationales but also with the foundational 
insider trading cases.  Third, focusing on this policy may have merit because 
certainty is a policy around which we likely can get some agreement.  Courts 
and commentators have suggested that this policy goal is actually important 
for all judicial doctrines.  Finally, so long as we are mindful that this policy 
goal may not be appropriate for all purposes, it may prove valuable.  Most of 
the ILEP panelists agreed that it is ill-advised to refrain from seeking to use 
a comprehensive principle to answer all of the vexing problems associated 
with the insider trading laws.  To that end, while policy could prove 
challenging as an answer to other issues, it may be that this policy works to 
resolve this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of insider trading makes it abundantly clear that demonstrating 
liability requires the existence of a fiduciary relationship.  Yet there is less 
clarity on whether state or federal law governs the question about what types 
of relationships are included in the definition of a fiduciary relationship.  The 
centrality of the fiduciary relationship to all forms of insider trading 
violations under Rule 10b-5 makes the lack of clarity on this issue especially 
concerning. 
In Whitman, Judge Rakoff waded into the debate regarding the appropriate 
source, holding that federal law controls the inquiry regarding what 
constitutes a fiduciary relationship.246  On the other side of that debate are 
those insisting that state law should control this inquiry. 
This Article firmly agrees with the central holding in Whitman.  However, 
this Article worries about mixed messages.  First, while the foundational 
cases clearly purport to create federal common law, that creation sits in 
considerable tension with other federal decisions and the sentiments of many 
of the Justices, including Justice Powell—the author of two of the seminal 
insider trading cases.  Moreover, the key cases both ignore state law and rely 
upon it, enhancing the confusing nature of those cases and making it difficult 
to rely on such cases to refute claims that state law should not dictate the 
contours of fiduciary relationships.  Second, the rationales being uplifted to 
support federal law—taken to their logical extensions—could crowd out 
important state law rules and resources.  States have a legitimate policy 
interest in policing fiduciary breaches stemming from insider trading 
violations.  Justifications that do not appropriately account for that interest 
may be particularly problematic.  The ultimate goal should be to pinpoint 
some rationale that acknowledges the important role of state law while 
uplifting the goals of the federal securities laws in general and the insider 
trading laws in particular.  The “topsy turvy” nature of insider trading law 
makes this a vexing task. 
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This Article’s core thesis highlights the difficulties with pinpointing a 
convincing rationale for the presumption of federal law on the question of 
the fiduciary relationship.  The Article offers the possibility of certainty as 
an alternative rationale.  In making this offering, this Article notes that 
perhaps we should refrain from seeking to pinpoint a guiding principle that 
answers all of the insider trading conundrums.  In this spirit, this Article 
indicates that certainty may provide a workable answer to the fiduciary 
relationship question, at least to the extent that the question involves an issue 
of coverage. 
